CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH AND
REJECTS

"GOOD-FAITH"

SEIZURE-NEW JERSEY

EXCEPTION

TO

EXCLUSIONARY

RULE--State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).

Increasingly, state supreme courts are interpreting their
state constitutions to afford greater protection of individual
rights than that extended by the United States Supreme Court
under the Federal Constitution.1 Although the Federal Constitution sets forth the minimum standard for the protection of constitutional rights, the United States Supreme Court has held that
each state has the "sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by
the Federal Constitution."' 2 This power is subject to two relatively minor limitations. 3 First, the state court must expressly indicate that a particular decision rests on "adequate and
independent state grounds." 4 Second, state constitutional provisions may not be construed to contravene extant federal constitutional protections. 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court has been recognized as a
forerunner in the development of state constitutional law. 6 The
court has, in specific instances, construed the New Jersey Constitution to provide more expansive protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than that afforded by its federal
counterpart.7 In State v. Novembrino,8 the Supreme Court of New
I See Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 708, 708 (1983). See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights 489 (1977). See generally, Symposium: The Emergence of State

ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985) [hereinafter Symposium]; Developments
in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1324
(1982) [hereinafter Developments].
2 See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (citing

Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968)); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)).
3 Sager, Foreward: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of
ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985).
4 Id. at 959 n.l (quoting Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983)).

5 Id. at 959.
6 See Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1160; Brennan, Foreward to Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 707

(1983).
7 See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (person has protectible
interest in telephone toll billing records under New Jersey Constitution art. I, para.
7); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) (concluding that possessory

interest in property is adequate to confer standing to challenge validity of search of
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Jersey interpreted Article I, paragraph 7 of the state constitution
to reject the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule created by the United States Supreme Court. 9
In 1983, Ottavio Novembrino, the owner of a service station
in Bayonne, New Jersey, was arrested and charged with possession of controlled dangerous substances and possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute.' 0 Novembrino
moved to suppress evidence obtained during a nonconsensual
search of his gas station." Novembrino argued that the search
warrant that the police relied upon was issued without probable
cause.' 2 He also maintained that the evidence was seized before
the warrant had been issued.'"
At the suppression hearing the parties related different accounts regarding the circumstances surrounding Novembrino's
arrest and the search of his garage. " Detective Higgins, who
prepared the search warrant application, testified that on June 2,
1983, two police officers stopped Novembrino as he was leaving
his gas station.' 5 While one officer engaged in a pat-down search
of the defendant, the other officer searched his car.' 6 Novembrino was not arrested, but he agreed to accompany the officers
7
to the station house.'
Higgins further testified that at the police station Novembrino was given Miranda warnings.' 8 After Novembrino refused
to allow the police to search his garage, Higgins stated that he
attempted to procure a search warrant.' 9 He recounted that he
automobile); State v. Johnson, 68 NJ. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (holding that validity of consent to -search depends on knowledge of the right to refuse consent).
8 105 NJ. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
9 Id. at 157-58, 519 A.2d at 856-57.
10 Id. at 102, 519 A.2d at 823. Novembrino was indicted for possession of
phentormine, diazepam, cocaine, hashish and marijuana in violation of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 24:21-20(a)(1) to -(4) (West Supp. 1987) and possession of phentormine,
cocaine, and diazepam with intent to distribute in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 24:21-19(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229,
232, 491 A.2d 37, 39 (App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 105 N.J. 95 (1987).
II Novembrino, 105 NJ. at 102, 519 A.2d at 823.
12 Id. at 103, 519 A.2d at 824.
'3 Id.
"4 Id. at 102, 519 A.2d at 824.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. Detective Higgins stated that Novembrino "drove to the station in his own
car, accompanied by one of the officers." Id. The detective said, however, that
neither officer advised Novembrino that he was free to leave. Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.
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prepared an affidavit in support of the warrant 20 and that he later
met a Bayonne municipal court judge at a shopping center,
where the affidavit was reviewed and the search warrant signed.2 '
The affidavit stated, among other things, that the officer had "received information from an informant who ha[d] proven reliable
in several
investigations" that the defendant was selling narcotics. 2 2 Higgins further stated that the informant had witnessed the
defendant dealing drugs from his service station. 23 The affiant
likewise asserted that he and another officer had observed what
they "believed to be drug transactions" during a four-hour surveillance of the station. 24 Finally, Higgins testified that he took
the search warrant and returned to the gas station where the defendant and another detective were waiting. 25 After showing the
defendant the warrant, Higgins stated that Novembrino unlocked
the door and led the officers to the contraband.26
In contrast, Novembrino testified that following the initial
stop and search of his car, he was taken to the police station and
strip-searched. 27 The defendant claimed that he was then taken
20 Id. Higgins stated that "this was the first such affidavit he had ever prepared
and estimated that its preparation took approximately ten or fifteen minutes." Id.
21 Id. at 102-03, 519 A.2d at 824.
22 Id. at 104, 519 A.2d at 824. The relevant portion of the affidavit stated:
I received information from an informant who has proven reliable in
several investigations (with the information he supplied), that 'Otto'
above description, is engaged in the illegal sales of cocaine and marijuana. My informant stated that Otto usually keeps the drugs in his gas
station at above location. He (informant) also stated that he witnessed
'Otto' dealing drugs from his gas station. I, along with Det. Ralph
Scianni, conducted a surveillance of subject and his station on Thurs.,
6/2/83, between the hours of 3:00 PM and 7:00 PM, and observed Otto
meeting with several persons, after leaving his station and making what
we believed to be drug transactions. During the surveillance, we observed one person making a transaction with Otto and checked on his
vehicle and called the narcotics squad to inquire on his relationship with
drugs. They told us that said person has been arrested for cocaine and
other violations and they felt that Otto and the other person are involved in drug activity. From the information received from our informant and from our observations, we do feel that a search of Otto's gas
station should be conducted for illegal contraband. We checked on
ownership of the station and it belongs to Otto who we have presently in
headquarters on this investigation. Otto was advised of his rights and
refused a search of his station but appeared to be very nervous.
Id., 519 A.2d at 824-25.
23 Id., 519 A.2d at 824.
24 Id., 519 A.2d at 824-25.

25 Id. at 103, 519 A.2d at 824.
26 Id.

27 Id.
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back to the garage by Higgins and the other officer.2 He asserted that they took his key, unlocked the door, searched the
premises and discovered the contraband. 2 9 Novembrino further
maintained that a warrant was not shown to him until eleven
30
o'clock that evening, long after the evidence had been seized.
Declining to rule on whether the search warrant was issued
prior to the search, the trial court excluded the evidence on the
ground that the affidavit supporting the warrant failed to show
probable cause. 3 ' The state appealed, and the appellate division
remanded for determination of when the search warrant was issued.3 2 On remand, the trial court found that the warrant had
been issued prior to the seizure." The appellate division upheld
that finding and agreed with the lower court's previous determination that the affidavit did not establish probable cause.3 4
The appellate division then considered the state's alternative
contention that, in the absence of probable cause, the evidence
could be admitted pursuant to the "good-faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Leon. 3 ' The appellate court ruled that the
New Jersey Constitution precludes a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule because of its tendency to "undermine the constitutional requirement of probable cause."'3 6 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey granted the state's motion for leave to appeal. 3 7 The supreme court affirmed that the affidavit did not es28
29

Id.
Id.

30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 103-04, 519 A.2d at 824-25. The appellate division stated:
The affidavit ...simply revealed that a police informant concluded for
unknown reasons that defendant was a drug dealer, that a person previously arrested for possession of cocaine was seen at defendant's gas station engaged in some unspecified activities which caused a detective,
whose education, training and experiences are unknown, to conclude
that criminal activities in the form of violations of Title 24 were taking
place at the gas station. The totality of the circumstances spelled out in
the affidavit failed to contain a single objective fact tending to engender
a "well grounded suspicion" that a crime was being committed.
Id. at 104, 519 A.2d at 825 (quoting State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 236,
491 A.2d 37, 41 (App. Div. 1985)).
35 Id. See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
36 Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 105, 519 A.2d at 825.
37 State v. Novembrino, 101 N.J. 305, 501 A.2d 962 (1985).
34
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tablish probable cause.3 Moreover, the court held that the state
constitution's guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures would not tolerate the good faith exception
established
39
in Leon, and thus the court refused to recognize it.

The language of New Jersey's constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures is virtually identical
to that contained in the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.4" Both the New Jersey and federal constitutions
designate probable cause as the standard by which an unreasonable search and seizure is distinguished from one that is permissible in a free society. 4 Probable cause has been defined by the
New Jersey and federal judiciaries as a "showing . . . not merely

of belief or suspicion, but of underlying facts or circumstances
which would warrant a prudent man in believing that the law was
being violated." 42 Moreover, like its federal counterpart, the
state's judiciary contemplates probable cause as "a flexible, nontechnical concept" which best accommodates the often competing interests of efficient criminal law enforcement and the
citizens' right to privacy.43
Most appellate decisions involving probable cause issues are
concerned with information obtained from unidentified police in38 Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 129, 519 A.2d
39 Id. at 157-58, 519 A.2d at 856-57.

at 840.

40 Id. at 99-100, 519 A.2d at 822. Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the papers and things to be seized.
N.J. CONsT. art. I, para. 7.
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41

Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 106, 519 A.2d at 826.

42

State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 260, 188 A.2d 389, 395 (1963). See also Henry v.

United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).

Probable cause exists "[if] the facts and

circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed." Id. (citing Stacey v. Emery,

97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)).
43

State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116, 244 A.2d 101, 104 (1968). See also Brine-

gar v.United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) ("The rule of probable cause is a
practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been
found for accommodating these often opposing interests.")
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formants. 4 4 New Jersey decisions concerning the validity of
search warrants issued on the basis of informants' tips have generally embraced the principles espoused by the United States
Supreme Court.4 5
Although the United States Supreme Court had previously
approved search warrants partially based on hearsay, 6 it was not
until 1960, in Jones v. United States, 4 7 that the Court expressly upheld a search warrant based on information obtained from an unidentified police informant. 8 Specifically,Jones held that a search
warrant affidavit which sets out the personal observations of
someone other than the affiant is sufficient provided "a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented."' 49 The Jones majority, however, did not set forth specific guidelines regarding the
type of information that would satisfy the standard.5 °
In State v. Macri,5 ' the NewJersey Supreme Court considered
the validity of search warrants issued on the basis of informants'
44

1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

612 (2d ed. 1987). Professor LaFave observed that "this particular facet of Fourth
Amendment law" has not been "set out with remarkable clarity." Id.
45 See, e.g., State v. Perry, 59 N.J. 383, 283 A.2d 330 (1971); State v. Macri, 39
N.J. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963).
46 See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). See also Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In Draper, the Court considered the validity of a
search, incidental to a warrantless arrest which was based solely on an informant's
statement that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 309-10. The
defendant contended that the evidence obtained during the search was inadmissible because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 311. He characterized the informant's tip as hearsay and, hence, legally insufficient to establish
probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest. Id. The Court upheld the search,
noting that the informant was known to the arresting officer as reliable and, furthermore the officer "personally verified" the informant's information as to the defendant's appearance and location at a certain time. Id. at 313.
47 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
48 Id. In Jones, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of narcotics obtained

during a search of an apartment he was occupying. Id. at 258-59. The search warrant was based on a federal narcotics officer's affidavit which stated that he had
received a tip from an unnamed informant that the defendant was engaged in drug
trafficking, that the informant had purchased drugs from the defendant previously,
and that the same information had been received from other sources. Id. at 268-69.
The affidavit also stated that the informant had previously given correct information. Id. at 268.
49 Id. at 269.
50 See id. TheJones Court held that an issuing magistrate need not be "convinced
of the presence" of contraband or other evidence at a particular location. See id.at
271. Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion stated that he would have required the
magistrate to "know the evidence on which the police propose[d] to act." Id. at 273
(Douglas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas asserted
that anything less would reduce the magistrate to a "tool of police interests." Id.
51 39 N.J. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963).
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tips. 5 2 At issue in Macri was an affidavit based on a tip received
from an unidentified police officer in which the affiant asserted
that a bookmaking operation was being conducted at a certain
location by the defendants.5
A companion case 5 4 involved a
detective's affidavit which stated his belief, formulated as a result
of an informant's tip and his own surveillance, that the defendants were involved in illegal gambling activities.5 5 Citing the
Jones standard, the Macri court deemed both warrants invalid because neither set forth "[t]he underlying facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the [officers'] suspicion[s]. 5 6
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided Aguilar v.
Texas, 7 which involved a search warrant issued pursuant to an
affidavit which stated only that the police officers had obtained
credible information from a reliable source and believed that narcotics could be found at a certain location.5 8 The affidavit provided no further details regarding either the informant or the
tip.5 9 In Aguilar the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test by
which state courts were to evaluate probable cause in search warrants issued upon tips from police informants. 6 ° The test's first,
or "basis-of-knowledge," prong required that the informant's tip
provide the issuing magistrate with facts sufficient to enable him
to determine whether the informant had an adequate basis for his
allegation that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, or
that evidence of criminal involvement could be found at a specific
location. 6 ' The second, or "veracity," prong required that the
52 See id. at 253-55, 188 A.2d at 390-92.
53 Id. at 253, 188 A.2d at 390. The affiant had received his information from

another police officer who, in turn, had received his information from an anonymous letter. Id., 188 A.2d at 391.

54 See id. at 252, 188 A.2d at 390. In the lower courts, the companion case was
entitled State v. Viscito. See id., 188 A.2d at 390.
55 d. at 253-54, 188 A.2d at 391.
56 See id. at 262, 188 A.2d at 395-96. See also supra note 49 and accompanying text

(discussing Jones standard).
57 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

58 Id. at 109.
59 Id. at 109 n.l.
60 Id. at 114.
61 See id. With regard to the affidavit in Aguilar, the Court asserted:

The affidavit here not only "contains no affirmative allegation that the
affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained
therein," it does not even contain an "affirmative allegation" that the
affiant's unidentified source "spoke with personal knowledge." For all
that appears, the source here merely suspected, believed or concluded
that there were narcotics in petitioner's possession. The magistrate
here certainly could not "judge for himself the persuasiveness of the
facts relied on . . . to show probable cause."

He necessarily accepted
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affidavit reveal "some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that the informant ...

was 'credible'

or his information 'reliable.' "62
The Aguilar test was broadened five years later by the
Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States,63 a case involving a
search warrant affidavit that was "more ample" than the affidavit
in Aguilar.6 4 Under this new approach an informant's tip was
"first [to] be measured against Aguilar's standards so that its probative value [could] be assessed." ' 65 If the tip was deemed insufficient under Aguilar, any details contained in the remainder of the
affidavit which corroborated the tip could then be considered.66
Spinelli also provided an additional method of satisfying the Aguilar basis-of-knowledge prong. 67 Absent a direct statement providing details of the method employed by the informant to gather
his information, the Court stated that an informant's basis of
from a sufficient description of the
knowledge could be inferred
68
accused criminal's activity.

"without question" the informant's "suspicion," "belief" or "mere
conclusion."
Id. at 113-14.
62 Id. at 114. The two prong standard, according to the Court, would ensure
that the probable cause determination would be drawn "by a neutral and detached
magistrate," as the Constitution requires ... [and not] "by a police officer 'engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' " Id. at 114-15 (quoting
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1957); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947)).
63 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
64 Id. at 413. The relevant portions of the affidavit stated that the FBI had kept
Spinelli, who was subsequently arrested for illegal gambling activities, under surveillance for five days during August of 1965. Id. It also indicated that Spinelli was
followed to a particular apartment which, the FBI later discovered, contained two
listed telephone numbers. Id. at 413-14. The affidavit stated that the defendant
was known to the FBI as a bookmaker, and that a "confidential reliable informant"
had told the FBI that the defendant was engaged in a bookmaking operation utilizing telephones which had been assigned the same numbers as those in the apartment surveilled. Id. at 414.
65 Id. at 415.
66 Id. The Court maintained that "[a]t this stage as well... the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's decision. He must ask: Can it fairly
be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration?" Id.
67 See id. at 416.
68 See id. The Court stated that: "The detail provided by the informant in Draper
v. United States ... provide[d] a suitable benchmark." Id. In Draper, the informant
did not state the manner in which he secured his information; he merely "reported
that Draper had gone to Chicago the day before by train and that he would return
... with three ounces of heroin on one of two specified mornings." Id. at 416. The
informant also described in detail the clothes the defendant would be wearing. Id.
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The first post-Aguilar informant case decided by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, State v. Kasabucki,69 neither acknowledged
nor applied the new standard.7 ° In Kasabucki, a warrant had issued on the basis of a letter received by the Union County Prosecutor from the New York City Police Department. 71 The letter
stated that the department had received confidential information
that the defendant's telephone was "being used for illegal gambling purposes. '72 The court applied a general reasonableness
test, stating that the issuing magistrate must make a "practical
and realistic" evaluation of a police officer's affidavit. 7 3 In doing
so, the court elaborated, the judge should take into account the
expertise of policemen.7 1 On this basis, the court upheld the
warrant stating "that the letter had a ring of authenticity. ' 7 The
court viewed the confidential information as substantial and reliable 76 and held that the circumstances justified the issuance of
"

the warrant.

77

The New Jersey Supreme Court only twice considered
search warrant applications under the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis.78
In State v. Perry,79 a police officer submitted an affidavit that stated
that he had received a tip from an informant that the defendant
was concealing stolen property in his apartment.8 0 The affidavit
also contained a list, provided by the informant, of the contraband.8 ' The court concluded that the affidavit satisfied Aguilar's
"veracity" prong because it explicitly stated that the affiant had
at 416-17. The Draper Court asserted that such detail would enable a magistrate
reasonably to "infer that the informant had obtained his information in a reliable
way." Id. at 417. In the Spinelli case, however, the informant merely asserted that
Spinelli was using certain telephones in an illegal gambling operation. Id. Such a
"meager report" was insufficient to meet the Spinelli test. See id. The Court also
stated that an informant's veracity, if sufficiently detailed in the affidavit, could be
bolstered by a corroborative investigation. See id.
69 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d 101 (1968).
70 See id.
71 Id. at 118, 244 A.2d at 104-05.
72 Id., 244 A.2d at 105.
73 See id. at 117, 244 A.2d at 104.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 120, 244 A.2d at 106.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 123, 244 A.2d at 107.
78 See State v. Ebron, 61 NJ. 207, 294 A.2d 1 (1972); State v. Perry, 59 N.J. 383,
283 A.2d 330 (1971). See also infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (discussing
Ebron and Perry).
79 59 NJ. 383, 283 A.2d 330 (1971).
80 Id. at 387, 283 A.2d at 333.
81 Id. at 388, 283 A.2d at 333.
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previously received reliable information from the informant.8 2
The court, likewise, held that the informant's specification of the
various stolen articles contained in the apartment was "of the
type . . . the Spinelli court regarded as sufficient to establish that
the information was obtained in a reliable way," thus satisfying

83
the second part of the test.
The following year in State v. Ebron,s4 the court considered a
search warrant affidavit which established the informant's past reliability, but provided no details as to the basis of the informant's
knowledge that the defendant was selling drugs from his
mother's home. 5 The Ebron court upheld the warrant, however,

under the Aguilar-Spinelli test.8 6 The courit reasoned that the independent surveillance of the home, as described in the affidavit,
8 7
enhanced the informer's tip.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Aguilar-Spinelli's requirements in Illinois v. Gates,8 and opted to return
to "the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally
ha[d] informed probable-cause determinations. "89 At issue in
Gates was a search warrant issued on the basis of a tip, contained
in an anonymous letter sent to an Illinois police department, that
was partially corroborated by police surveillance. 90 The Court
offered several reasons for its abandonment of the test. ForeId. at 390, 293 A.2d at 334.
Id. at 392, 283 A.2d at 335. The Perry court observed that "the magistrate...
could well have believed, based on common experience, when the several items
described are so diversified, and include among them such an unusual article as a
doctor's bag, and their location particularized, that the informant knew from personal knowledge what he was talking about." Id. at 393, 283 A.2d at 335.
84 61 N.J. 207, 294 A.2d 1 (1972).
85 See id. at 211-12, 294 A.2d at 3. The affidavit stated that the affiant believed
the defendant was selling drugs from his home, based "upon information said to
have been received from reliable sources and from an informer who had proven
reliable in the past." Id. at 211, 294 A.2d at 3. The affidavit further declared that
the location to be searched had been placed under surveillance for three days and
that known drug addicts were observed visiting the premises. Id. The affidavit also
stated that the defendant's mother, the owner of the premises, was at that time
appealing a prior drug conviction. Id. at 211-12, 294 A.2d at 3.
86 Id. at 212, 294 A.2d at 4.
87 Id. at 213, 294 A.2d at 4. The court held that the independent surveillance,
the subsequent identification of the seven known drug users, and the mother's dereliction were all "entitled to some weight on the probable cause issue." Id.
88 462 U.S. 213 (1984).
89 Id. at 238 (citations omitted).
90 Id. at 225-26. The letter stated that the Gates' "strictly ma[d]e their living on
selling drugs." Id.at 225. The letter described in detail the Gates' method of operation and specified the date of the next drug transaction. Id. Police surveillance of
the Gates' activities corroborated most of the allegations in the letter. Id. at 226.
82
83
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most was the majority's view, articulated by Justice Rehnquist,
that the two-pronged test of Aguilar-Spinelli resulted in "excessively technical dissection of informants' tips" by focusing exclusively on the isolated and independent issues of an informant's
veracity and basis of knowledge. 9" The totality of the circumstances test, on the other hand, "permits a balanced assessment
of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and
unreliability) attending an informant's tip. '"92
The court further justified its new standard observing that
the quanta of proof required to establish probable cause is less
than that required to prove a defendant's guilt in a criminal
trial.93 Moreover, the Court noted that search warrant affidavits
are usually prepared by non-lawyers and the warrants are often
issued by lay-persons ignorant of the latest judicial refinements
in the probable cause area. 94 Furthermore, the Gates court
viewed strict after-the-fact scrutiny of search warrant affidavits as
"inconsistent with the [ffourth [a]mendment's strong preference
for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." 9' 5 The Court observed that the technicalities of Aguilar-Spinelli would encourage
resort to warrantless searches, thus thwarting the warrant preference. 9 6 Finally, the Court stated that rigorous application of the
old test provided a serious impediment to law enforcement and
would greatly reduce the value of informant's tips in police
work.9 7
In formulating the new test, the Court emphasized that an
informant's veracity, basis of knowledge, and reliability are still
highly relevant issues to be considered in the probable cause determination.9 8 Under the Gates test, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply:
to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, includ91 Id. at 233-35. The Court stated that these two elements "are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis." Id.
at 233. The Court observed that "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in
determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by
some other indicia of reliability." Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)).
92 Id. at 234.
93 See id. at 235.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 236.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 237.
98 Id. at 230.
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ing the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
99
place.
Hearkening back to Jones, the Court held that the duty of the reviewing court is merely "to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial
100
basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed."'
Although both the federal and New Jersey constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, neither authority contains
enforcement or remedial provisions. In 1914, the United States
Supreme Court, in Weeks v. United States,' 0 ' created the exclusionary
rule, which bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment in a federal criminal trial.'0 2 Prior to 1961,
state courts were not required to apply the exclusionary rule, so
long as other "equally effective" methods were employed to enforce
the protections of the fourth amendment.' 0 3 New Jersey, like most
other states, did not recognize the rule. 10 4 Instead, the state judiciary steadfastly endorsed the proposition "that competent proof
shall be available for the prosecution
of the offense notwithstanding
'0 5
illegality in the seizure."'
99 Id. at 238.
100 Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).

101 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
102 Id. In Weeks, the Court limited the application of the exclusionary remedy to
federal courts and federal officials. Id. at 398. The Court rested its holding on two
grounds. First, the Court stated that the federal courts should not sanction "a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the Constitution" by police officers. Id. at
394. Second, the Court reasoned that unless illegally obtained evidence was excluded, there would be no value to the protections of the fourth amendment. Id. at

393.

103 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949). In Wolf, the Supreme Court held
that the right to be free from arbitrary governmental intrusion is "implicit in the
'concept of ordered liberty' " and thus enforceable against the states via the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 27-28. The Court refused,
however, to incorporate the exclusionary rule. Id. at 33. The Court's conclusion
was based on its analysis of the treatment the rule had received in the state courts
since its inception. Id. at 29. The Court noted that before Weeks, twenty-seven
states had considered adoption of the exclusionary rule. Id. Of these, twenty-six
had declined to adopt it. Id. Moreover, since Weeks, forty-seven states had considered the exclusionary doctrine: thirty-one had rejected it and sixteen had endorsed
it. Id. Also, the Court noted that ten jurisdictions in the United Kingdom and the
British Commonwealth of Nations had considered adoption of the rule and not one
had done so. Id. at 30. Finally, the Court was convinced that the other remedies
made available by the States to victims of police transgressions were sufficient to
redress the constitutional violation. Id. at 30-32.
104 Id. at 29-30.
105 Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 509-10, 141 A.2d 46, 48 (1958) (citations
omitted).
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In the years following Weeks, litigants occasionally urged the
New Jersey Supreme Court to adopt the federal rule."0 6 In State v.
Alexander,' 0 7 the court declined to do so, remaining unconvinced of
the efficacy of "discarding a rule of constitutional construction
which has for many years demonstrated its practical worth and its
soundness in the administration of justice in this jurisdiction."'0 8
The Alexander court stated that abandonment of the rule of admissibility would
have been "a step backward and inimical to the public
10 9
good."'

The court reaffirmed this position seven years later in Eleuteri v.
Richman.tl 0 In rejecting the plaintiff's motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a "clearly illegal" search,"' Chief Justice Weintraub balanced the two purposes of the exclusionary rule, the deterrence of illegal police conduct and the preservation of judicial
12
integrity, against society's need for effective law enforcement."
The court emphasized that the rule benefits only the guilty and that
it envelops with uncertainty an area of law enforcement which requires clarity and consistency." 3 Moreover, the Chief Justice asserted that since states contend with more violent crimes, the stakes
of setting criminals free are greater at the state level than at the federal level." 4 The Eleuteri court stated that the suppression of evidence was not remedial in nature.' " Rather, the court held that the
rule was merely a deterrent device designed "to compel respect for
the guaranty by removing an incentive to disregard it.

11 6

Ulti-

mately, the court refused to adopt such a wide sanction in a case
17
where its deterrent purpose would not be served."
106
107
108

See infra notes 107-117 and accompanying text.
7 N.J. 585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951).
Id. at 595, 83 A.2d at 445-46.

109 Id., 83 A.2d at 446.

26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46 (1958).
See id.at 508, 141 A.2d at 47. The plaintiffs in Eleuteri commenced an action in
the chancery division to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant
issued by a magistrate authorizing "a search beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
his court." Id. at 507-08, 141 A.2d at 47.
112 Id. at 511-12, 141 A.2d at 49. Chief Justice Weintraub was a staunch opponent of the exclusionary rule. For an excellent discussion of the history of the exclusionary rule during Chief Justice Weintraub's tenure, see Wefing, New Jersey
Supreme Court v. United States Supreme Court, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 771 (1976).
113 Eleuteri, 26 N.J. at 512-13, 141 A.2d at 49-50.
114 Id. at 512, 141 A.2d at 50. The court also stated that "there [was] no persuasive evidence that the constitutional guaranty fares better in jurisdictions which embrace the federal rule." Id. at 513, 141 A.2d at 50.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See id. at 515, 141 A.2d at 51-52.
110
'''
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Three years later, however, the United States Supreme Court,
in Mapp v. Ohio,"' stated that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally required, and held it applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 9 The Mapp court
concluded that to hold otherwise would provide the right to be free
from unreasonable state intrusion but actually to withhold its enjoyment.1 20 The Mapp Court asserted that the exclusionary rule served
two distinct purposes: the deterrence of unlawful police conduct
and the preservation of judicial integrity.121
Five months after the Mapp decision, the New Jersey Supreme
22
Court first recognized the exclusionary rule in State v. Valentin.1
The defendant in Valentin was indicted for concealing a shotgun in
his automobile without a permit. 123 He moved to exclude the shotgun as evidence on the ground that it was procured by means of an
unconstitutional search and seizure. 2 4 The trial court denied the
motion without receiving an offer of proof by the prosecutor on the
issue of the legality of the search. 12 5 The supreme court remanded
126
the case for reconsideration of the issue in light of Mapp.
118 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
119 Id. at 657. In Mapp, the Court reconsidered the factual grounds on which the
Court based its decision in Wolfv. Colorado. Id. at 651. The Court noted that while
prior to Wolf "almost two-thirds of the [s]tates were opposed to the use of the
exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf case, more than half of those since passing
upon it . . . have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule." Id. (citations omitted). The Court also stated that the other remedies provided by the
states to victims of fourth amendment violations had proven to be "worthless and
futile." Id. at 652.
120 Id. at 656.
121 Id. at 656, 659.
122 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737 (1961).
123 Id. at 42, 174 A.2d at 737.
124 Id. at 42-43, 174 A.2d at 737.
125 Id. at 43, 174 A.2d 738. The Valentin court noted that the prosecution was not
remiss in failing to submit an offer of proof in light of the fact that at the time of the
trial New Jersey's rule of admissibility was still intact. Id.
126 Id. at 44, 174 A.2d at 737. Mapp's effective incorporation of the exclusionary
rule did little to abate the New Jersey Supreme Court's antagonism toward its application. See Wefing, supra note 112, at 777-794. Under the leadership of Weintraub,
whose tenure as ChiefJustice continued until 1973, the court consistently avoided
the suppression of evidence in criminal trials. See id. Of the sixty search and seizure
cases decided between 1962 and 1973, only eight resulted in the granting of criminal defendants' suppression motions. Id. at 777, 780. Fifty-one suppression motions were denied, and one case was remanded for further proceedings in the trial
court. Id. at 780.
These statistics are attributable to the Weintraub court's conviction that "the
right of the individual to live free from criminal attack in his home, his work, and
the streets" outweighed the individual's right to be protected against unreasonable
intrusion by law enforcement officials. Id. at 786 n.51 (quoting State v. Davis, 50
N.J. 16, 22, 231 A.2d 793, 796 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 105 (1968)). A second
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Following Valentin, the New Jersey Supreme Court abided by
Mapp and suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to unconstitutional police practices.'1 7 The court did not, however, embrace the
federal courts' reasoning behind the exclusionary rule.' 28 The New
Jersey Supreme Court ignored the judicial integrity rationale and
viewed the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule to be the deterrence of unlawful police conduct.129 As a result of this distinction,
exclusionary rule when its dethe court avoided application of 3the
0
terrent purpose was not served.1
In State v. Gerardo,13 1 the court refused to suppress evidence in a
state prosecution which had been properly procured by federal offi3 2
cials for use in a federal case which was no longer maintainable.
The court stated that "[s]uppression is ordered, not to rectify a
wrong already done, but to deter future violations" of insolence in
office. 1 33 The court deemed the suppression of evidence, in cases
where there was no official misconduct, a "waste" of an innocent
34
person's right to be free from criminal attack.'
Two years later, in State v. Bisaccia,13 5 the court questioned
whether the exclusionary rule effectuated its deterrent purpose at
factor underlying the Weintraub court's resistance to suppression was the exclusionary rule's interference with the criminal justice systems' truthfinding function.
Id. at 783.
127 See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 459 A.2d 1149 (1983) (granting suppression motion where state failed to prove minimal procedural requirements to
assure reliability of telephone authorized search); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 397
A.2d 1062 (1979) (granting suppression motion where justification for impoundment of a vehicle and subsequent warrantless search was insufficient); State v.
Fariello, 71 N.J. 552, 366 A.2d 1313 (1976) (granting suppression motion where
search warrant affidavit lacked probable cause and issuing magistrate made no transcription or summary of officer's testimony).
128 See, e.g., State v. Bisacci, 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971). See infra notes 135142 and accompanying text (discussing Bisacci).
129 See, e.g., State v. Zito, 54 N.J. 206, 210, 254 A.2d 769, 771 (1969) ("Suppression is a judge-made device to deter future acts of insolence in office rather than to
rectify a wrong already done.").
130 See, e.g., Delguidice v. NewJersey Racing Comm'n, 100 N.J. 79,494 A.2d 1007
(1985); State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 427 A.2d 525 (1981); State v. Bisacci, 58 N.J.
586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971); State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 250 A.2d 130 (1969).
131 53 N.J. 261, 250 A.2d 130 (1969).
132 Id. at 263, 250 A.2d at 131.
133 Id. at 267, 250 A.2d at 133.
134 Id. For largely the same reasons, the court concluded in State v. Zito that a
police officer's reliance on a statute later held unconstitutional was not unreasonable and did not require suppression of the evidence seized. State v. Zito, 54 N.J.
206, 210-11, 254 A.2d 769, 771 (1969). The court stated that suppression in that
instance would result in "a windfall to the criminal, and serve no laudable end." Id.
at 213, 254 A.2d at 772.
135 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971).
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all. 1 36 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Weintraub stated that
when truthful evidence is suppressed, "the pain ...is felt, not by the
inanimate [s]tate or by some penitent policeman, but by the offender's next victims.137 The court also asserted that the rule's re-

sultant release of guilty criminals "blunt[s] and breed[s] contempt
for the deterrent thrust of the criminal law."' 3 8 The court stressed
that the exclusionary rule was created solely for the purpose of ending insolence in office,' 39 and viewed Mapp as requiring suppression
even when the police and issuing magistrate acted in good faith.' 4 '
In the Chief Justice's view, this indiscriminate suppression constituted "overkill." 14' As such, the court refused to suppress evidence
obtained pursuant to a search warrant, the only defect of which was
the erroneous listing of the premises to be searched as number 371,
instead of 375.142
Ten years later, in State v. Burstein, 143 the New Jersey Supreme
Court reaffirmed deterrence as the exclusionary rule's primary justification. 14 4 The court denied retroactive effect to its decision in
State v. Cerbo,' 4 5 in which it had held that a delay in sealing tapes of
intercepted conversations required suppression absent a satisfactory
explanation.' 4 6 One of the factors to be considered in the determination of retroactivity, the Burstein court pointed out, was whether
retroactive application would further the rule's purpose. 14 7 The
court stated that "[i]n cases where the new rule is an exclusionary
rule, meant solely to deter illegal police conduct, the new rule is
136 Id. at 589, 279 A.2d at 677. The court stated that: "The question is whether
suppression of the truth with the consequent acquittal of the guilty is a fair and an
effective measure to that end." Id. The court concluded that it is doubtful "[t]hat
suppression is effective in curtailing infractions of the [fourth] [a]mendment." Id.
137 Id. at 590, 279 A.2d at 677.
138 Id. The court also stated that "Mapp has left [s]tate officers quite at sea as to
what is expected of them." Id. The court likewise complained that "[sitate courts
(and the federal bench as well) are drained of energy sorely needed for the trial of
criminal and civil cases, as motions to suppress are piled upon motions, appeals
upon appeals, and post-conviction proceedings upon post-conviction proceedings." Id. at 591, 279 A.2d at 677.
139
140

Id.
Id. at 591-92, 279 A.2d at 677.

141 Id. at 591, 279 A.2d at 677.
142

Id. at 592-93, 279 A.2d at 678.

143 85 NJ. 394, 427 A.2d 525 (1981).

See id.
78 N.J. 595, 397 A.2d 671 (1979).
Id. at 601-02, 397 A.2d at 674.
Burstein, 85 N.J. at 406, 427 A.2d at 531. The other two factors to be considered, according to the court, were: (1) "the reliance placed on the old rule by those
charged with administering it;" and (2) "the effect that retroactive application
would have on the administration of justice." Id. (citations omitted).
144

'45
146
147
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virtually never given retroactive effect . . . [because] the deterrent
purposes of such a rule would not be advanced by applying it to past
misconduct." 4 8
In Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Commission,' 4 9 the court held
that a finding of entrapment and subsequent dismissal of criminal
charges against a jockey who had accepted a bribe did not require
suppression of incriminating evidence in a licensing hearing before
the New Jersey Racing Commission. 150 The court concluded that
the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose would not be "efficaciously served" by suppressing the evidence in the licensing hearing. 151 The court noted that the state police were the sole offending
officials, and concluded that "the deterrent effect of excluding evidence [was] highly attenuated when the entity forbidden from using
the evidence [was] not the same entity whose agents engaged in the
illegal maneuvers."' 152 Moreover, the state police had already been
sanctioned by a dismissal of the criminal proceedings. 53 The court
also rejected the appellant's contention that the imperative of judicial integrity mandated exclusion of the evidence. 15 4 The court
noted that in this instance, as with most fourth amendment violations, "the evidence [was] unquestionably accurate and the wrong
15 5
[was] complete by the time the evidence reache[d] the court."'
Thus, the court reasoned that the only question was whether the
admission of the evidence would encourage misconduct by law en148

Id.

149 100 N.J.
150 Id. at 92,

79, 494 A.2d 1007 (1985).
494 A.2d at 1013. Delguidice initially was charged with "conspiracy
to rig a publicly-exhibited contest . . . and for agreeing to accept a benefit for rigging a publicly-exhibited contest." Id. at 81, 494 A.2d at 1008. The law division
dismissed the criminal indictments, however, determining that the state police officers' actions in procuring them were "sufficiently improper as to warrant a finding
of entrapment." Id.
The New Jersey Racing Commission then informed Delguidice that it would
not renew his license for the following year. Id. at 82, 494 A.2d at 1008. This decision was affirmed in a formal hearing. Id. Delguidice appealed the Racing Commission's decision on the ground that, because the undercover police investigation
tactics had been deemed offensive, "all evidence relating to the dismissed criminal
indictments should have been excluded from the licensing hearing." Id. The appellate division reversed, however, holding that admitting such evidence was
proper because excluding it "would have no substantial deterrent effect upon future unlawful police conduct." Id. at 82-83, 494 A.2d at 1008-09 (citing United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)).
151 Id. at 84, 494 A.2d at 1009 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 45354 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
152 Id. at 87, 494 A.2d at 1011.
'53 Id.
154 Id. at 88, 494 A.2d at 1011-12.
'55 Id. at 89, 494 A.2d at 1012.
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For this reason, the court de-

clared that the goal of revoking racing licenses was not sufficiently
important to law enforcement officials to encourage them to resort
to illegal techniques to7 gather evidence otherwise inadmissible in
criminal proceedings.'

5

New Jersey's continued endorsement of the deterrence rationale foreshadowed later developments of the exclusionary rule in the
United States Supreme Court. Following the Weeks decision, the

Supreme Court consistently recognized deterrence and judicial in58
tegrity as two distinct purposes served by the exclusionary rule.1
In its decisions since Mapp v. Ohio, however, the Court has recognized the rule's deterrent purpose to the virtual exclusion of the judicial integrity rationale. 15
This has resulted in the Court's
restriction of the rule's application to only those cases in which the
deterrent purpose would be served.' 60 This in turn has caused a
substantial reduction of the rule's scope in the federal arena.' 6'
In Linkletter v. Walker, 162 the United States Supreme Court held

that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to state court convictions which had become final before the Mapp decision.1

63

The

Court stated that all of its decisions since 1949 "requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence ha[d] been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action."

164

In the Court's view,

156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 222 (1960). Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, stated in Elkins that the exclusionary rule's "purpose is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217 (citing
Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 513, 141 A.2d 46, 50 (1958)). The Court further
stated that "there is another consideration-the imperative ofjudicial integrity ....
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law .... To
declare that ... the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution." Id. at 222-23, (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)).
159 See infra notes 162-199 and accompanying text.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
163 Id. at 640. In Linkletter, the defendant's burglary conviction had been affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in February 1960, over a year before Mapp was
decided. Id. at 621. After the Mapp decision, Linkletter filed a habeas corpus petition seeking Mapp's retroactive application. Id. The Court considered the underlying purpose of Mapp, the reliance placed upon Wolf by the police officers in
question, and effect that a retroactive application of Mapp would have on the judicial system. Id. at 636. The Court held that the retroactive application of Mapp
"would tax the administration ofjustice to the utmost." Id. at 637.
164 Id. at 636-37.
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releasing the prisoners involved would not correct police misconduct which occurred prior to the decision in Mapp.' 6 5
In Alderman v. United States,' 6 6 the Court held that a defendant
whose rights had not been violated by the government's transgression of the fourth amendment did not have standing to move to suppress evidence seized in violation of a codefendant's fourth
amendment right. 16 7 Engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, the Alderman court stated it was "not convinced that the additional benefits of
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted
on the ba16 8
sis of all the evidence which exposes the truth."'
Five years later, in United States v. Calandra,"9 the Court refused
to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings.17 0 The
Court recognized only the rule's broad deterrent purpose, and
stated that "[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule
has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served."''
According to the Calandra
Court, application of the rule in the grand jury context would only
deter police conduct consciously undertaken to discover evidence
exclusively to be used in a grand jury proceeding.' 72 The Court
maintained that the likelihood of such an occurrence was "substantially negated" by the fact that evidence so obtained would not be
admissible later at trial.' 7 3 The Court utilized the Alderman balancing approach and held that the speculative and minimal advance of
the rule's deterrent purpose was outweighed by the substantial imposition that application of the rule would have on the grand
jury. 171 Significantly, the Court declared that the exclusionary rule
165

Id. at 637.

166

394 U.S. 165 (1969).

Id. at 171-72. In Alderman, after the defendants had been convicted of conspiring to transmit death threats via interstate commerce, it was discovered that one
of their places of business had been the target of unlawful electronic surveillance by
167

the government. Id. at 167-68. The defendants sought to suppress the evidence

obtained as a result of the eavesdropping. Id. at 171. They argued that "if evidence
[was] inadmissible against one defendant or conspirator, because tainted by electronic surveillance illegal as to him, it [was] also inadmissible against his codefendant or co-conspirator." Id.
168 Id. at 174-75.
169 414 U.S. 338 (1974)
170 Id. at 342.
171 Id. at 348.
172 Id. at 351.
173

174

Id.

Id. at 351-52. The Court stressed the necessity of weighing the "potential
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was merely "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
[f]ourth [a]mendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." '7 5
In 1976, two more significant limitations were created. 1 76 In
Stone v. Powell,' 77 the Court refused to consider the exclusionary rule
in habeas corpus proceedings. 7 8 The Court held that once a defendant has had an opportunity to litigate the suppression issue in a
state court, he may not be granted habeas corpus relief because the
evidence offered at trial was the product of an unconstitutional
search or seizure.' 79 The Court emphasized the costs of extending
the rule to collateral review of fourth amendment claims.' 80 The
Court stated that the overall deterrent effect of the rule would not
be significantly diminished if defendants were barred from relitigating the exclusionary issue on review of state convictions.'"' The
Court also reiterated its conclusion that the exclusionary rule was
82
not a constitutional right.'
In United States v. Janis,8 3 the Court declared the exclusionary
rule inapplicable in civil proceedings. 84 Applying the cost-benefit
analysis, the Court stated that "the enforcement of admittedly valid
laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary rule and,
as is nearly always the case with the rule, concededly relevant and
damage to the role and functions of the grand jury . . .[against] the benefits to be
derived from this proposed extension of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 350-51.
175 Id. at 348. This holding contradicted the assertion in Mapp that the exclusionary rule was a constitutional right. See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
176 See infra notes 177-186 and accompanying text.
177
178

179

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 494.
Id. at 481-82.

180 Id. at 489-90. The Court reasoned that "[a]pplication of the rule.., deflects
the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty." Id. at 490. Thus, the Court
noted that application of the rule "may well have the... effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice." Id. at 491.

181
182
183

Id. at 493.
Id. at 486.
428 U.S. 433 (1976).

184 Id. at 454. InJanis, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) made a tax assessment
against the defendants who were arrested on gambling charges. Id. at 436-37. The
IRS placed a levy upon cash seized by state police officers pursuant to a search
warrant. Id. at 437. The warrant was later deemed defective in state court. Id. at
438. Defendants then filed a claim for a refund of the money levied upon by the
IRS. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that the defendants were entitled to a refund as all of the evidence used in
making the assessment was obtained in violation of the defendants' fourth amendment rights. Id. at 438.
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reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable."' 8 5 Since application of the rule was not likely to result in appreciable deterrence, the
86
Court deemed its use in a federal civil proceeding unwarranted.'
Two decisions, United States v. Peltier'8 7 and Michigan v. DeFillippo, 188 foreshadowed the Court's ultimate recognition of the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule.' 8 9 In Peltier, the Court refused to apply retroactively its decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 9' which set forth the standard for determining the legality of
border searches.' 9 ' The Peltier Court stated that because the search
in question had occurred prior to its decision in Almeida-Sanchez, the
police could not have known the conduct employed in searching the
defendant was unlawful.' 9 2 The judicial integrity rationale resurfaced briefly in the Peltier Court's statement that "if the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they
had seized was admissible at trial, the 'imperative of judicial integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that material even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have
broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in
that manner."' 19 3 Moreover, the Court stated that the rule's deterrent purpose could only be effected if the police officer knew or
should have known that the search was invalid under the fourth
amendment.' 9
Similarly, in De Fillippo, the good-faith exception was implicated
in the Court's holding that the exclusionary rule was unavailable
when a defendant was arrested under to a law later declared unconstitutional.' 9 5 The defendant in DeFillippo was arrested under to a
Detroit ordinance which allowed police to detain an individual and
question him if the officer reasonably believed that the suspect's behavior warranted further criminal investigation. 9 6 An amendment
to the ordinance provided that it was unlawful for any person detained "to refuse to identify himself and produce evidence of his

186

Id. at 447.
Id. at 454.

187

422 U.S. 531 (1975).

185

188 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
189 See infra notes 190-199 and accompanying text.
190

413 U.S. 266 (1973).

191 Peltier, 422 U.S. at 532-535.
192 Id. at 541-42.
193 Id. at 537.
194 Id. at 542.
195 See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-38 (1979).
196 Id. at 33.
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identity."'' 9 7 A search made incidental to the defendant's arrest
yielded narcotics.' 9 8 When the ordinance was later declared unconstitutionally vague, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that his
fourth amendment rights were violated as a result of the search.' 9 9
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court finally adopted a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v.
Leon.2 ° ° The Court held "that evidence obtained in violation of the
[f]ourth [a]mendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate need not be excluded, as a matter of federal law, from the casein-chief of federal and state criminal prosecutions. "'201 The Court
maintained that the marginal benefits produced by excluding evidence gathered in objectively reasonable reliance upon a search
warrant later deemed invalid could not justify the costs of
exclusion.2 °2
The Leon Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is not
constitutionally compelled, and that its sole purpose is deterrence. 20 3 For the suppression of evidence to effect this purpose,
Id.
Id. at 34.
199 Id. at 35.
200 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, a search warrant issued on the basis of a partially corroborated informant's tip was found to be insufficient for lack of probable
cause by the district court. Id. at 903. This finding was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 904. Both the district and circuit courts rejected the government's request to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 904-05. The government did not request review of the probable
cause issue in its petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; rather,
it confined the scope of the petition to the question of whether the "exclusionary
rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective." Id. at 905.
201 See id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court emphasized the objective
reasonableness requirement and maintained that the good faith exception will not
apply in cases where a police officer intentionally misleads the magistrate issuing
the search warrant. Id. at 922-23. Likewise, the exception will not apply in cases
where the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role since in such cases no welltrained officer would reasonably rely on the warrant. Id. at 923. Nor would a police
officer be justified "in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'" Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part)). Finally, the Court stated that an officer's reliance on a warrant
that "fail[ed] to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized" or
was otherwise facially deficient, would not trigger the good faith exception. Id.
202 Id. at 922.
203 See id. at 906, 909-10. The Court reiterated that "[t]he rule ...operates as 'a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard [flourth [a]mendment rights generally though its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
197
198
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Justice White stated, it must engender a change of conduct among
law enforcement personnel or a change of policy within law enforcement agencies. 20 4 The Court concluded that such a result is not
reached when officers reasonably rely on a warrant.20 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court has rendered several decisions
which have collaterally affected the scope of the exclusionary rule,
making the suppression remedy available in New Jersey courts in
instances where it would be unavailable in the federal courts.20 6 In
1975, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Johnson,20 7 considered the meaning of the term "voluntariness" in the context of consent searches. 20 8 The Johnson court acknowledged that the United
States Supreme Court had held that voluntariness was to be determined by the "totality-of-the circumstances" test. 20 9 The court relied on the state constitutional provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures to reject the federal approach, and hold that
before a person could be deemed to have consented to a search, the
state must show that he knowingly waived his constitutional right to
refuse consent. 2 10 Thus, the Johnson court provided that a criminal
defendant could move to suppress evidence on the issue of waiver,
21 1
although such a motion was unavailable in a federal proceeding.
In State v. Alston, 21 2 the court used the state constitution to reject three decisions by the United States Supreme Court which, cumulatively, denied standing to any defendant who failed to establish
"a reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular area searched,
party aggrieved.' " Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974)).
204 Id. at 918. The Court stressed that the rule's deterrent purpose was not even
implicated in cases involving defective warrants issued by magistrates as the "rule is
designed to deter police misconduct rather than punish the errors of judges and
Magistrates." Id. at 916. The Court also noted that judges have no personal interest in the outcome of criminal prosecutions. Id. at 917. Thus, according to the
Court, "admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at the same time
declaring that the warrant was somehow defective [would not] in any way reduce
judicial officers' professional incentives to comply with the [f]ourth [a]mendment,
encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of colorable warrant requests." Id.
205 Id.
206 See infra notes 207-18 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Hunt, 91
N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211,440 A.2d 1311 (1981);
State v. Johnson, 68 NJ. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)).
207 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
208 Id. at 352, 346 A.2d at 67.
209 Id. at 352, 346 A.2d at 67 (citing Schneckloff v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
235-47 (1973)).
210 Id. at 353-54, 346 A.2d at 67-68.
211 See id. at 354, 346 A.2d at 68.
212 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981).
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even where the movant [was] the owner or legitimate possessor of
the property seized." 2 1 Unlike a federal criminal defendant, the
Alston court held that a criminal defendant in New Jersey could
maintain a suppression motion whenever he had a possessory, proprietary or participatory interest in the place unlawfully searched or
the objects unlawfully seized.2 1 4
The following year in State v. Hunt,2 15 the court again used the
state constitution to reject a United States Supreme Court decision
which had held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
in a pen register under the fourth amendment. 21 6 The court stated
that "sound policy reasons" justified a departure from federal precedent.2 17 Because of New Jersey's settled policy of protecting telephonic communications, the court held that a person has a
protectible interest in toll billing records. 1 8
In State v. Novembrino, the Supreme Court of New Jersey again
interpreted the state constitution to provide greater protection for
the rights of criminal defendants than has been afforded by the
United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution.2 19
Underscoring the state constitution's intolerance of warrants issued
without probable cause, the court rejected the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon.22 °
In an opinion by Justice Stein, the Novembrino court initially assessed the validity of the disputed search warrant in light of the constitutionally prescribed standard of probable cause. 2 2 ' Noting that
the relevant federal case law was not characterized "by clarity and
213 Id. at 224-25, 440 A.2d at 1317-18 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978)). In Rakas v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that passengers in an automobile, who had neither a possessory nor property interest in either the vehicle or the
objects seized, did not have their constitutional rights violated by a search of the
vehicle. 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). In United States v. Salvucci, the Court rejected the
doctrine of "automatic standing" which provided that a person charged with a possessory crime automatically had standing to object to the validity of the search and
seizure. 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980). In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the companion case to
Salvucci, the Court held that a defendant had no standing to object to a search of
another's purse. 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980).
214 Alston, 88 N.J. at 228, 440 A.2d at 1319.
215 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
216 Id. at 343, 450 A.2d at 954-55. Contra Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979). A pen register "records the numbers dialed on a telephone." Hunt, 91 N.J.
at 342, 450 A.2d at 953.
217 Id. at 345, 450 A.2d at 955.
218 Id. at 345-47, 450 A.2d at 955-56.
219 See State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
220 Id. at 157-58, 519 A.2d at 856-57.
221 Id. at 105, 519 A.2d at 825-26.
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consistency," the court reviewed both the state and federal cases involving the issue of probable cause in the context of search warrants
based on informant's tips to determine the proper standard of review. 22 2 The court stated that New Jersey decisions on probable
cause recognized the same principles articulated by the federal
courts. 2 2' The Novembrino court concluded that the "totality-of-the-

circumstances" test, adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Illinois v. Gates, was the appropriate standard by which to review the
sufficiency of search warrants under the NewJersey Constitution.2 2 4
The court asserted that the Gates test, which incorporated the veracity and basis of knowledge prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli, was substantially consistent with the court's traditional approach to the
resolution of probable cause issues.2 2 5
Turning to the affidavit in question, the court concluded that
the informant's allegations, by themselves, were insufficient to support a showing of probable cause. 226 Although the reference in the
affidavit to the unidentified informant satisfied the credibility requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli, the court observed that the substance
of the tip was "meager indeed. ' 227 Specifically, the affidavit lacked
any precise reference as to when the informant had witnessed the
alleged drug transactions. 2 28 Thus, Justice Stein concluded that the
issuing magistrate had no reason to suspect that a present search of
the defendant's premises would produce evidence of criminal activity. 229 Moreover, the court considered the informant's statements
regarding the drug deals he claimed to have witnessed as "bald conclusion[s], allegedly based on personal observation, but unsupported by any reference to dates, events, or circumstances. '"230
Further, the majority stated that the officers' own observations,
Id. at 108, 519 A.2d at 827.
Id. at 119-20, 519 A.2d at 835.
Id. at 122, 519 A.2d at 836. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text
(discussing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1984)).
225 Id. at 123; 519 A.2d at 837.
226 Id. at 125, 519 A.2d at 838.
227 Id. at 124, 519 A.2d at 837. According to justice Stein, the veracity prong was
satisfied by the detective's "unvarnished statement that [the informant] 'ha[d]
proven reliable in several investigations [in the past] (with the information he supplied).' " Id. at 123, 519 A.2d at 837. The court pointed out that it had previously
accepted "similarly undetailed endorsements" by law enforcement affiants regarding the veracity of informants. Id. The affidavit further satisfied the basis-of-knowledge prong by the informant's assertion that he had witnessed the defendant
dealing drugs from the gas station. Id. at 124, 519 A.2d at 837.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 125, 519 A.2d at 838.
222
223
224
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described in the affidavit, did not adequately serve to supplement
the informant's assertions. 2 3 ' The court pointed out that the affidavit was devoid of any reference to the officers' previous experience
in narcotics investigations, a factor to be accorded some weight in
the assessment of probable cause.2 3 2 The crucial flaw, according to
the court, was that the affidavit contained no specific facts to support
the officers' suspicions that the defendant was conducting drug
transactions. 233 The affidavit asserted merely that the officers had
"observed [Novembrino] meeting with several persons, after leaving
his station and making what [they] believed to be drug transactions. ' 234 Justice Stein noted that had the officers reasonably believed "that they were in fact witnessing drug transactions, they
would have been authorized to [make an immediate] arrest.

' 23 5

Sig-

occurred.2 3 6

nificantly, no arrest
Moreover, the court ruled that because the affidavit failed to
indicate with precision the officer's observations and the basis for
their belief that drugs were being sold, the issuing judge could not
have concluded that the officer's suspicions were reasonable.2 3 7
The court considered the detectives' assertions "even less certain
and less persuasive than the conclusory and vague allegations of the
informant. ' 23 8 Thus, the court determined that even combined
with the informant's allegations, the officers' observations failed to
provide the issuing judge with facts sufficient to permit a reasonable
inference that the probable cause existed.2 39
The court next addressed the state's request that the unlawfully
seized evidence be held admissible under the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon. 24 ' The
court assumed without deciding the question that the decision
Id. at 128, 619 A.2d at 839.
Id. at 126, 519 A.2d at 838.
Id. at 127, 519 A.2d at 839.
Id. at 126, 519 A.2d at 839.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 127, 519 A.2d at 839.
Id.
Id. at 128, 519 A.2d at 839.
Id. Collaterally, the court took note of the affidavit's hasty preparation, the
officers' inexperience in preparing search warrant affidavits and the fact that the
affidavit was not reviewed by a superior officer. Id. at 129, 519 A.2d at 840. The
court stated that its recognition of these factors reflected its "conviction that an
affidavit in support of a search warrant must be carefully prepared and reviewed to
assure that it faithfully reflects the results of the police investigation and provides a
judge with sufficient detail to enable him to perform his constitutionally-mandated
review." Id.
240 Id. at 129-30, 519 A.2d at 840 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984)).
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
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in Leon was intended to apply retroactively. 24 ' The court also
adopted, without admitting its correctness, the appellate division's
finding that the detectives' reliance on the warrant in question was
objectively reasonable.2" 2
The court commenced its analysis of the merits of adopting a
good-faith exception with an overview of the historical development
of the exclusionary rule.2 4 3 The court noted that since the rule became enforceable against the states in 1961, its scope had been
steadily diminished.2 4 " Justice Stein examined the rule's treatment
during the 1970's, attributing its compression to the Burger Court's
abandonment of the "judicial integrity" rationale and recognition of
deterrence as the rule's exclusive justification. 24 5 Equally responsible, according to Justice Stein, has been the Supreme Court's consistent application, in suppression cases, of a cost-benefit analysis
under which the rule's deterrent benefits are balanced against the
cost to society of suppressing relevant evidence. 246 The court noted
that in cases where the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose was
not advanced, it has not been applied.2 4 7
The court undertook an extensive analysis of both the majority
and minority opinions in Leon. 24 8 According to Justice Stein, Leon
represented "the most significant limitation of the exclusionary rule
since its genesis," because no decision antedating it had specifically
contradicted the firmly entrenched principle that unlawfully seized
evidence was inadmissible in criminal prosecutions. 2 4 9 Ultimately,
the court interpreted Leon to indicate that "in suppression cases involving warrants the application of the exclusionary rule [would] be
the exception, and recognition of the good-faith 'exception' [would]
241 See id. at 130, 519 A.2d at 841. Justice Stein noted the Eighth Circuit's observation, in United States v. Sager, that "on the day Leon was decided the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgments in several fourth-amendment
cases, remanding them for further consideration in light of Leon." Id. (citing United
States v. Sager, 743 F.2d 1261, 1264-65 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985)).
Justice Stein further observed that the federal appeals courts that have considered
the issue have determined that Leon applies retroactively. Id. at 131, 519 A.2d at
841.
242 Id. at 132, 519 A.2d at 842. As a prerequisite to application of the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, Leon requires a finding that the officer acted in
good-faith upon an improperly issued warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23.
243 See Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 132-39, 519 A.2d at 842-45.
244 Id. at 137, 519 A.2d at 844.
245 See id. at 137-39, 519 A.2d at 844-45.
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 See id. at 139-44, 519 A.2d at 845-49.

249

Id. at 138-39, 519 A.2d at 845.
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be the prevailing standard. ' 25 ° Since this result would "undermine
the constitutionally-guaranteed standard of probable cause," the
25 t
New Jersey Supreme Court declined to endorse it.

Acknowledging the value of uniformity between state and federal courts in administration of criminal laws, the court nevertheless
justified its rejection of Leon by stating that it had frequently construed New Jersey's own constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures to afford broader protection than that
offered by the fourth amendment.2 5 2 The resolution of constitutional issues on independent state grounds was permissible, the
court stated, when matters of "particular state interest," such as individual privacy rights and enforcement of criminal laws, are at
stake.2 5 3 The court asserted that recognition of the good-faith exception would disserve the state's strong interest in preserving the
constitutional guarantee that search warrants "shall not issue except
upon probable cause. "254
The court examined the extent of the state's interest in the
preservation of a strict standard of probable cause.2 5 5 Justice Stein
noted that prior to the Mapp decision, New Jersey, like most other
states,2 56 did not recognize the exclusionary rule, but adhered instead to a rule of admissibility even in cases where the search and
seizure were deemed unconstitutional. 25 7 The majority asserted,
however, that since 1961, the exclusionary rule has become a fixture
of New Jersey jurisprudence, and all illegally obtained evidence has
consistently been suppressed.2 58
250 Id. at 139, 519 A.2d at 846. The court emphasized the Leon Court's statement
that suppression of evidence would henceforth "be ordered only on a case-by-case
basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of
the exclusionary rule." Id,(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918
(1984)).
251 Id. at 157-58, 519 A.2d at 856-57.
252 Id. at 145, 154, 519 A.2d at 849-50, 854-55, (citing State v. Hunt, 91 NJ. 338,
450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211,440 A.2d 1311 (1981); State v.
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)). See supra notes 206-218 and accompanying text.
253 See Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 146, 519 A.2d at 850.
254 See id. at 155, 519 A.2d at 855 (quoting N.J. CoNsT. art. I, para. 7).
255 See id. at 146-54, 519 A.2d at 850-55.
256 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
257 Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 147, 519 A.2d at 850 (citing Eleuteri v. Richman, 26
N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46 (1958)). The court also pointed out that the delegates to
NewJersey's Constitutional Convention of 1947 expressly rejected an amendment
that would have incorporated the exclusionary rule into Article 1, paragraph 7. Id.,
519 A.2d at 850-51.
2_58 Id. at 148, 519 A.2d at 851 (citing State v. Valentin, 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737
(1961)).
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The court discussed several recent developments in the state's
criminal justice system which were further illustrative of the extent
of the state's interest in the maintenance of the probable cause standard.2 5 Justice Stein pointed out that the state legislature had incorporated the exclusionary rule in the New Jersey Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1968.260 He observed that
this statute specifically requires the suppression of any evidence obtained through an interception which is unauthorized, insufficiently
authorized, or otherwise inconsistent with the statutory guidelines. 2 6 ' Significantly, the court noted that although good faith reliance by a police officer on an invalid authorization is a defense to
any proceeding instituted against him, the statute nonetheless requires the suppression of the wrongfully obtained evidence.2 6 2
The majority further observed that state law enforcement agencies have also instituted measures designed to ensure the vitality of
the probable cause standard.2 63 Noted by the court was a presentment issued by a grand jury in Union County condemning the issuance of a search warrant because of defects in the local police
procedure. 2 64 The court also cited a joint policy statement issued
by the Attorney General and the County Prosecutor's Association,
the intent of which was to accomplish the "institutionalization of a
systematic search warrant review procedure in NewJersey.

26 5

Jus-

tice Stein observed that the statement provides for statewide
mandatory review, by an authorized official, of all search warrant
applications.2 6 6 In addition, he noted that the state offers regular
search warrant training programs to all municipal court judges.2 6 7
The court "assumed" that the combined effect of these initiatives would be to maximize "compliance with the probable-cause
standard and minimize the incidents of suppression of evidence because of defectively-issued warrants. 2 68 In this context, the court
also took note of a recent study of suppression motions conducted
by the Administrative Office of the Courts. 269 The study suggested
that in NewJersey the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to
259 Id. at 149-52, 519 A.2d at 852-53.
260 Id. at 149, 519 A.2d at 852.
261 Id.
262

Id.

263
264

Id. at 150, 519 A.2d at 852.
Id.

265

Id.

266

Id.

267

Id.

268
269

Id. at 150-51, 519 A.2d at 852-53.
Id. at 151-52, 519 A.2d at 853.
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invalid search warrants was relatively uncommon and posed no serious threat to law enforcement efforts.2 7 °
The court next focused on "the inevitable tension between the
proposed good faith exception and the [constitutional] guarantee
. . . that search warrants 'shall not issue except upon probable

cause.' "271 Justice Stein posited that the state's demonstrated commitment to the constitutional mandate of probable cause wAuld be
undermined by recognition of the good faith exception because of
the disincentive to comply with the constitutional standard it inevitably creates.2 7 2 The court reasoned that because Leon eliminates
any sanction for non-compliance with the probable cause strictures,
the quality of evidence offered in search warrant applications would
inevitably and inexorably" be diminished.2 7 3
Further justifying this position, the court stated that other jurisdictions have refused to adopt the good-faith exception because of
its tendency to dilute the constitutional standard.2 7 4 Moreover, Justice Stein asserted that unlike at the federal level, New Jersey has
experienced no "dilution of the probable cause standard," but
rather, has enhanced efforts to ensure its vitality.175 Nor, he pointed
out, has application of the exclusionary rule hampered effective enforcement of the state's criminal laws.2 7 6 The court conceded the
possible efficacy of a good-faith exception in jurisdictions where
warrants are issued by "non-lawyer magistrates," and the likelihood
of defective warrants is increased.2 7 7 Justice Stein concluded that
these considerations were "plainly" not applicable in New Jersey.2 7 8
Ultimately, the court held that the exclusionary rule is "an integral
element of [the] state-constitutional guarantee" against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 79 The court specifically rejected the exclusivity of the deterrence rationale and stated that "[t]he rule ...
serves as the indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitu28 °
tional right to be free from unreasonable searches.
In a concurring opinion,Justice Handler agreed with the majority's adoption of the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test, and,
Id.
Id. at 155, 519 A.2d at 855 (quoting N.J.
See id. at 152-53, 519 A.2d at 853-54.
Id. at 153, 519 A.2d at 854.
See id. at 154 n.38, 519 A.2d at 855 n.38.
See id. at 155, 519 A.2d at 855.
Id.
Id. at 156, 519 A.2d at 855.
Id., 519 A.2d at 856.
279 Id. at 157, 519 A.2d at 856.
280 Id.
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

CONST.

art. I, para. 7).
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likewise, with its determination that the affidavit underlying the
search warrant lacked probable cause. 2 1' He also agreed with the
majority's rejection of the good-faith exception because of its tendency to dilute the probable cause standard.28 2 Justice Handler disapproved, however, of the court's elevation of the exclusionary rule
to a constitutional right. 28 ' Rather, he viewed the rule as a judicially-created remedy that, although legally potent, and vitally necessary to ensure constitutional compliance, is merely ancillary to an
individual's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.2 8 4 He stated that he would continue to apply
28 5
the rule as a matter of state common law.
Justice Handler stated that the majority's characterization of the
rule as a constitutional right was not supported by case law, constitutional history, or sound public policy. 2 86 He asserted that since
the inception of the exclusionary rule in New Jersey, the court
"ha[d] consistently and unfailingly stressed its deterrent purpose
and its origins as a court-created remedy designed to discourage improper police conduct. ' 28 7 Justice Handler stated that the scope of
the rule, rather than the purpose, had been broadened to include
police misconduct that was mistaken or misguided, as well as intentional.2 8 8 Strong judicial deference had traditionally not been paid,
he observed, to either the judicial integrity or compensation rationales. 28 9 As such, Justice Handler considered it "an exaggeration to
say that the rule ...

ha[d] acquired constitutional stature." 2'9 Thus,

Justice Handler deemed it unnecessary and unwise for the court to
transpose "an ancillary rule ...

from a common-law doctrine into a

constitutional right."129 1 Such a step, he asserted, not only would
preclude future judicial development of the rule or possible alterna281 Id. at 160-61, 519 A.2d at 858 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler asserted that the majority's "extensive exposition" of the probable cause issue was
unnecessary, and suggested that the majority should simply have adopted "the
sound position of the [aippellate [dlivision." Id.
282 Id. at 161, 519 A.2d at 858 (Handler, J., concurring).
283 Id. at 160, 519 A.2d at 858 (Handler, J., concurring).
284 Id. at 163, 519 A.2d at 859-60 (Handler, J., concurring).
285 Id. at 174, 519 A.2d at 864-65 (Handler, J., concurring).
286 Id. at 164, 519 A.2d at 860 (Handler, J., concurring).
287 Id. at 166, 519 A.2d at 861 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler also
posited that the rule had only been employed to remedy culpable police misconduct. Id. at 165, 519 A.2d at 861.
288 Id. at 166, 519 A.2d at 861 (Handler, J., concurring).
289 Id. at 167-68, 519 A.2d at 862 (Handler, J., concurring).
290 Id. at 167, 519 A.2d at 862. (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler also
noted the express defeat of the exclusionary rule amendment at the 1947 Constitutional Convention. Id. at 169, 519 A.2d at 863 (Handler, J., concurring).
291 Id. at 170, 519 A.2d at 863-64 (Handler, J., concurring).
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tives, but would also prohibit the other government branches from
exercising their responsibilities with respect to enforcement of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures .292

Justice Garibaldi filed a separate opinion in which she concurred with the majority's decision to adopt the Gates totality-of-thecircumstances test, 29 3 but dissented from the court's rejection of the
good-faith exception.2 9 4 She asserted that the Leon doctrine reflects
a more thoughtful appreciation of the high costs of the exclusionary
rule, and better accommodates the often competing interests of the
public in effective law enforcement and the individual in protection
against unreasonable governmental intrusion.2 9 5 Like Justice Handler, Justice Garibaldi objected to the majority's
characterization of
29 6
the exclusionary rule as a constitutional right.

29 7
Justice Garibaldi's dissent rested on two specific grounds.
First, she disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the goodfaith exception undermines police compliance with the constitutional requirement of probable cause. 2 9 1 She believed the major
justification behind the exclusionary rule to be deterrence of improper police conduct. 29 9 The justice emphasized that the goodfaith exception is invoked only when an officer has acted reasonably,
but mistakenly, in his assessment of probable cause.3 0 0 Applying
the exclusionary rule in such instances cannot serve to deter future
violations, Justice Garibaldi asserted, but rather serves only to keep
"relevant and probative evidence from the jury, thereby substantially impairing or aborting the trial."3 0 ' Justice Garibaldi further
maintained that unchecked application of the exclusionary rule

could actually undermine the rule's deterrent function.3 0
292
293

part).

2

Justice

Id. at 170-71, 519 A.2d at 864 (Handler, J., concurring).
Id. at 174, 519 A.2d at 866 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting in

294 Id. at 174-75, 519 A.2d at 866 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
295 Id. at 175, 519 A.2d at 866 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
296 Id.
297 See id.
298 Id. at 178, 519 A.2d at 868 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
299 Id. at 175, 519 A.2d at 866 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
300 Id. at 178-79, 519 A.2d at 868 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
301 Id. at 180, 519 A.2d at 869 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
302 Id. at 178, 519 A.2d at 868 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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Garibaldi disagreed with the majority's assumption that police officers would use the good-faith exception deliberately to secure and
execute insufficient search warrants.30 3 Rather, she maintained that
adequate protection against such abuse was built into the requirement that search warrants be issued by neutral and detached
judges.*° 4

Secondly, Justice Garibaldi maintained that there exist no independent constitutional grounds justifying the majority's deviation
from federal law.3 0 5 She maintained that the Leon rule and its rationale have long been recognized in New Jersey precedents, traditions and practice. 0 6 Examining the history of the exclusionary rule
in New Jersey, Justice Garibaldi concluded that because the court
has always viewed deterrence as the prime justification for the rule,
it has only been applied to redress culpable police misconduct.3 0 7
She also argued that New Jersey courts have measured the validity
of searches and seizures by the same objective reasonableness test
utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Leon. 3 °a Moreover,
Justice Garibaldi noted that as in Leon, the New Jersey courts have
measured police officers' conduct "in a practical and realistic manner." 3° 9 Therefore, Justice Garibaldi asserted "that New Jersey has
no historical attachment to the exclusionary rule."131 0 Applying the
good-faith exception to the facts of the Novembrino case, Justice Garipart). Justice Garibaldi cited one critic's observation that "[instead of disciplining
their employees, police departments generally have adopted the attitude that the
courts cannot be satisfied, that the rules are hopelessly complicated and subject to
change, and that the suppression of evidence is the courts' problem and not the
departments.'" Id. (quoting Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 1027, 1050 (1974)).
303 Id. at 180-81, 519 A.2d at 869 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
304 Id. In this context, Justice Garibaldi cited the suppression motion survey conducted by the Administrative Office of the Courts. Id. at 181 n.2, 519 A.2d at 86970 n.2 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since only one of
the eighty-two motions studied involved a search conducted pursuant to a search
warrant, Justice Garibaldi, in contrast to the majority, concluded "that judges
[were] acting properly in reviewing search warrant applications." Id. See supra text
accompanying notes 269-70 for the majority's interpretation of these statistics.
305 Novembino, 105 N.J. at 182, 519 A.2d at 870 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
306 Id.
307 Id. at 184, 519 A.2d at 871 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
308 See id. at 185, 519 A.2d at 872 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
309 Id.
310 Id. at 186, 519 A.2d at 872-73 (GaribaldiJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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baldi concluded that the judgment of the appellate division should
have been reversed and the evidence held admissible.3 1 1
On the surface, the New Jersey Supreme Court's rejection of
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not surprising in
view of the court's demonstrated tendency to be more liberal than
the United States Supreme Court in protecting criminal defendants'
constitutional rights. What is surprising is the court's unanimous
endorsement of the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to
assess the validity of search warrants. The court rejected Leon because it feared the good-faith exception will promote the demise of
the constitutional standard of probable cause. 312 The adoption of
the more lenient Gates test is inconsistent with this reasoning.
Criticism of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to probable cause is abundant. Some have characterized the standard as
overly-permissive towards unlawful police practices in that it substantially reduces the role of the issuing magistrate in reviewing
search warrant applications and enforcing the probable cause requirements.3 13 Others maintain that the Gates decision has reduced
the probable cause standard to nothing more than a general reasonableness test, validating searches based on a "mere suspicion" that
evidence of a crime will be found at a particular location.3 14 Justice
White, in his concurring opinion in Gates went so far as to predict
that the decision would cause "an evisceration of the probable-cause
standard. '31 5 Notwithstanding the validity of the various criticisms,
one inevitable result of New Jersey's application of the totality-ofthe-circumstances test will be determinations of probable cause in
search warrants which, under the more rigorous Aguilar-Spinelli inquiry, would not have been made.
The majority might more appropriately have vindicated the
state's strong interest in preserving the probable cause guarantee by
rejecting Gates, not Leon. As one scholar has noted, most search and
seizure decisions involve questions of probable cause.3 1 6 Very few
311

Id. at 187, 519 A.2d at 873 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
Id. at 157-58, 158, 519 A.2d at 856-57.
See Mascolo, Probable Cause Revisited: Some DisturbingImplications Emanatingfrom
Illinois v. Gates, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 331, 331-32 (1983); Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 184 (1983).
314 See Mascolo, supra note 313, at 413-14; Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking
Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 237, 340 (1984).
315 Gates, 462 U.S. at 272 (White, J., concurring).
316 J. Wefing, Thoughts on State v. Novembrino and the New Jersey Constitutional Provisions on Search and Seizure 10 (1987) (unpublished manuscript) (available in the files of SETON HALL LAW REVIEW).
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search and seizure decisions "involve the good-faith exception." ' 7
Justice Stein himself observed that suppression motions based on
defective search warrants are infrequently granted in NewJersey.3 ' 8
The majority rejected Leon so as not to "disrupt the highly effective
procedures" implemented by the state to ensure the vitality of the
probable cause guarantee.3 9 Rejection for this reason is unwarranted. As one expert has noted, recognition of the Gates test "totally obviates" the need for a good-faith exception, since "[a]fter
Gates it does not require very much to 0issue a warrant, [and] it takes
32
even less to uphold one on review.

The court's reasoning behind its rejection of the good-faith exception is, likewise, unpersuasive. The relevant case law supports
Justice Garibaldi's assertion that in New Jersey, deterrence has been
the exclusionary rule's dominant justification.3"2 ' Also validated by
the decisions is her suggestion that the New Jersey courts have, in
the past, recognized a type of good-faith exception by refusing to
suppress evidence in cases where the police misconduct was not culpable. 2 2 The majority opinion ignored these precedents and selectively cited cases that support its proposition that "the exclusionary
rule has become imbedded in [the state's] jurisprudence. "323 Indeed, the rule has become entrenched in New Jersey's criminal law,
but only because the United States Supreme Court mandated this
result in Mapp v. Ohio. Similarly unprecedented is Justice Stein's assertion that the exclusionary rule serves the additional purpose of
"vindicating the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches" and seizures.3 2 4 Thus, although the court's transformation of the exclusionary rule into a constitutional right may be laudable, it is not supported by precedent.
In State v. Novembrino, the New Jersey Supreme Court has, for
the fourth time, used the state constitution as justification for departing from federal search and seizure law.3 25 Although this pracId.
Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 152, 519 A.2d at 853.
319 Id. at 158, 519 A.2d at 857.
320 Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV.
551, 552, 589 (1984).
321 Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 175, 519 A.2d at 866 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
322 Id. at 184, 519 A.2d at 871 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
323 See id. at 148, 519 A.2d at 851.
324 See id. at 157, 519 A'.2d at 856.
325 For a discussion of the other three decisions, see supra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
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tice has been sanctioned and encouraged by the United States
Supreme Court,3 2 6 significant debate exists as to the circumstances
that justify a state's deviation from federal precedent and the methods employed by the states in substituting state for federal constitutional law.3 27 Advocates of the "primacy" approach argue that
federal law should be considered "only after all claims resting on
state law have failed to provide the requested protections. 3 2 8 This
approach has been criticized for its unrealistic failure to recognize
the current fact of federal dominance in the protection of individual
rights. 3 2 9 New Jersey implicitly has endorsed the "interstitial"
model, under which the state recognizes the federal doctrine as
dominant, and "asks whether and how to criticize, amplify, or supplement this doctrine to yield more extensive constitutional
protections. '"330
The court has not, however, clearly indicated when it will follow
federal law and when it will look to state law to determine the contours of a particular constitutional right. Novembrino provided the
court with an occasion to establish the necessary guidelines. The
court neither seized the opportunity, nor acknowledged the necessity of doing so. Instead, the Novembrino majority relied on the
vague standard announced in State v. Hunt, that "[slound policy reasons . . . may justify a departure" from federal precedent.331
In a concurring opinion in Hunt, Justice Handler acknowledged
that notions of "healthy federalism" justified the state courts' trend
of acting independently under their own state constitutions.3 3 2 He
also recognized, however, the value of consistency and uniformity in
certain areas of constitutional law. 33 3 He, thus, deemed it necessary
to elucidate criteria to determine when the Constitution of New
Jersey may appropriately be invoked to provide greater protection
of individual rights. 334 The factors to be considered include textual
and structural differences between the two constitutions, legislative
history, preexisting state law matters of particular state interest,
state traditions, and public opinion. 33 5 Interestingly, in his concurSee supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See generally Developments, supra note 1, at 1324.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1357-58. See also Pollock, supra note 1, at 718-22.
331 Hunt, 91 N.J. at 345, 450 A.2d at 955. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text (discussing Hunt).
332 Hunt, 91 N.J. at 362-63, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
333 Id. at 363, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
334 Id., 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler, J., concurring).
335 Id. at 364-68, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J., concurring).
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ring opinion in Novembrino, Justice Handler did not allude to the
analysis he proposed in Hunt.3" 6 Perhaps this is because utilization
of the suggested criteria would have compelled rejection of the totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause and adoption of
the good-faith exception.3 3 7
Nancy McDonald
336
337

See Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 159-74, 519 A.2d 857-66 (Handler, J., concurring).
Wefing, supra note 316, at 10.

